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CURRENT LEGISLATION
from the indemnitor's liability insurer. The reasoning of La Gumina
v. Citizens Casualty Co.,16 and of the New York cases construing
former Section 109, would lead to the conclusion that the indemnity
creditor would be denied recourse against the indemnity debtor's lia-
bility insurer.
Thus it is seen that since the less restrictive phrasing of Section
167 -did not lead to less restrictive interpretation, there was a need
for a more specific statutory amendment. Subsection seven gives
to the assignee, the contribution creditor, and the indemnitee creditor
the same right of action as is given to the injured party or his per-
sonal representative.
KENNETH Fox.
RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT DIRECTORS, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES
TO REIMBURSEMENT FOR DEFENSE OF STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE
AcTION.-The New York Legislature at its last session enacted
Article 6a of the General Corporation Law.' The primary purpose
of this article is an attempt to eliminate the "benefit rule" as estab-
lished by the courts in declaring the common law and in interpreting
former Section 61a of the General Corporation Law.2
At common law, the court, in New York Dock Co., Inc. v.
McColluin,s required a defendant director to show that some direct
benefit had accrued to the corporation before he would be allowed re-
imbursement for his successful defense of a stockholders' derivative
action. However, that this was paradoxical 4 was apparent and even
recognized by the McCollum case which established the "benefit rule",
since it is obvious that a corporation stands to gain only if the plain-
tiff stockholder is successful.
Soon after the McCollum case, and probably as a result, the
legislature enacted former Section 61a of the General Corporation
Law, presumably to remedy the effect of the McCollum case. How-
ever, in subsequently interpreting the two main divisions of Section
16 Supra note 11.
I N. Y. Laws 1945, c. 869, effective April 1945.
2 N. Y. Laws 1941, c. 350, § 1, effective April 1941, repealed L. 1945,
c. 869, § 2.3 New York Dock Co., Inc. v. McCollum, 173 Misc. 106, 16 N. Y. S. (2d)
844 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
In this case, former Court of Appeals Judge Crouch, sitting as official
referee, concluded that there is no legal or equitable right to reimbursement
for a director's successful defense of a stockholders' derivative action except
where a director can show that: "in conducting his own defense successfully,
he has conserved some substantial interest of the corporation which otherwise
might not have been conserved or has brought some definite benefit to the
corporation which otherwise might have been missed"; Bailey v. Bush Ter-
minal, 293 N. Y. 735, 56 N. E. (2d) 739 (1944). Contra: Soliminie v. Hol-
lander et al., 129 N. J. Eq. 264, 19A (2d) 344 (1941).
4 In the words of former Court of Appeals Judge Crouch: "Just how
such a state of facts can come about, however, is not very clear to the referee."
1945 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
61a, the courts seemed to frustrate the apparent intent of the legis-
lature. The first division of the statute 5 was construed as giving
the defendant a strict and absolute right to reimbursement, 6 while
retaining in the second part 7 the "benefit rule" by construing it as
leaving the question of reimbursement to the discretion of the courts.
The latter decided that reimbursement should not be allowed unless
a direct benefit accrued to the corporation.8 Thus, despite the use
of the word "shall" in both portions of the statute, the courts, by
their construction of the second half, as giving them discretion in
granting the allowance, make the usually mandatory word "shall"
come to mean "must" in the first part, and "may" in the second.
This was the state of the law until Article 6a of the General Corpo-
ration Law was enacted by the last session of the legislature.
This new article declared: "any person made a party to any ac-
tion, suit, or proceeding by reason of the fact that he, his testator or
intestate, is or was a director, officer, or employee of a corporation
shall be entitled to have his reasonable expenses . . .assessed against
the corporation .. . upon court order ... ." 10 and states that pay-
s "In any action, suit, or proceeding against one or more officers or di-
rectors ...of a corporation ... the reasonable expenses, including attorney's
fees ...incurred in connection with the successful prosecution or defense of
such action, suit, or proceeding shall be assessed upon the corporation. .. ."
6 Hayman v. Morris, 179 Misc. 265, 37 N. Y. S. (2d) 884 (Sup. Ct. 1942);
In re Bailey, 178 Misc. 1045, 37 N. Y. S. (2d) 275 (Sup. Ct. 1942), rev'd on
other grounds, 265 App. Div. 758, 40 N. Y. S. (2d) 746 (1st Dep't 1943),
aff'd, 291 N. Y. 534, 59 N. E. (2d) 653 (1943); Neuberger v. Barrett, 180
Misc. 222, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 575 CSup. Ct. 1942).
7 "If the party or parties shall be successful in part only, or if such ac-
tion, suit, or proceeding shall be settled with the approval of the court...
the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fee, ...shall be assessed upon
the corporation in such amount as such court shall determine and find to be
reasonable in the circumstances."
8 Drivas v. Lekas, 182 Misc. 567, 48 N. Y. S. (2d) 785 (Sup. Ct. 1944);
Neuberger v. Barrett, 180 Misc. 222, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 575 (Sup. Ct. 1942),
cited supra note 6. In this case, the court held: "The Legislature in enacting
Section 61a made a distinction between 'successful prosecution or defense' of
a derivative stockholders' suit, and a settlement of such suits, In the former,
it apparently wished to make certain that the conclusion reached in the
McCollum case was changed, and therefore it decided that reasonable expenses
be paid where the directors have been judicially exonerated from liability.
But with respect to a settlement, the provision of the statute is that the ex-
penses 'shall be assessed upon the corporation in such amount as such court
shall determine and find to be reasonable in the circumstances . . . .'" (Italics
by court.) "The differences between the two cases ...make it discretionary
with the court as to whether any counsel fees shall be granted in the case of
a settlement . . . ." Since, in this case, the defendant had brought no benefit
to the corporation, the court could find nothing upon which to exercise
discretion.
9 30 Coax. L. Q. 252.
1o N. Y. GE. CoRp. LAW § 64 makes the following exception: "except in
relation to matters as to which it shall be adjudged . . . that such officer,
director, or employee is liable for negligence or misconduct in the performance
of his duties."
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ment is to be made when "the court shall find the applicant was suc-
cessful in whole or in part or that the action against him has been
settled. . . the court shall grant such application in such amount as
it shall find to be reasonable and shall make an order directing the
corporation to pay to the applicant the amount awarded. . . ."". In
reading the two sections together, we can conclude that the legislature,
attempting to change the "benefit rule" as construed under Section
61a, intended the defendant to have an absolute right to reimburse-
ment for his success in whole or in part or for settlement suits, with-
out his having to show any benefit to the corporation, leaving but the
amount to the discretion of the court. This is the only logical con-
struction of the statute. The only other interpretation would be that
the courts have discretion as to whether reimbursement should be
allowed, in which case, the statute would be rendered ineffective and
merely declarative of common law as established by 'the McCollun
case, for, as we have seen, where the courts have had such discretion,
they required the defendant to show a direct benefit to the corporation.
The new law, in addition to attempting to change the "benefit
rule", has set up a procedure for obtaining assessment or payment of
expenses and attorneys' fees. Applications may be made either in
the action, suit, or proceeding in which the expenses were incurred,
or in a separate action in the Supreme Court. However, if a sep-
arate suit is brought, the application must show reasonable grounds
why application was not made in the suit in which the expenses were
incurred. The application must also show the disposition of any
previous application.12  The law further provides that an application
shall be made in the manner and form that the applicable rules of the
court require, or if there are no such rules, then by the direction of
the court. Finally, the law requires notice to be given to the corpo-
ration, but grants the court discretion as to whether or not the notice
shall be given at the expense of the corporation.13
Thus the new law remedies the defects of the old Sections 27a 14
and 61a, which by their failure to set up procedures for payment or
assessment of expenses, raised questions of constitutionality because,
as a general rule,'3 a statute which omits requirements of notice vio-
lates the "due process" clause of the Constitution.' 6 The new law,
as an exercise of the reserve power of the state to alter or amend
corporate charters, is undeniably constitutional.
"I N. Y. GEN. CORp. LAW § 67.
22 N. Y. GEN. CoRp. LAW § 65.
'3 N. Y. GEN. Co'. LAW § 66.
14 N. Y. Laws 1941, c. 209, effective April 1941, amended and renumbered
§ 63 GEN. CoRP. LAW by N. Y. Laws 1945, c. 869.
15 State ex rel. v. District Court of Second Judicial Dist. et al., 33 Mont.
529, 85 P. 367 (1906); Hayman v. Morris, 179 Misc. 265, 37 N. Y. S. (2d)
884 (Sup. Ct. 1942), cited supra note 6.
16 U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
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Article 6a makes a further correction in former Sections 27a and
61a by omitting the word "plaintiff" throughout. The old sections
granted the right of reimbursement to plaintiff as well as defendant.
This provision was unnecessary in view of the fact that at common
law the right of a successful plaintiff stockholder is always recognized
if he has shown a benefit to the corporation, 17 which is of course
merely the nominal defendant in suits of this kind and therefore must
stand to gain if the plaintiff is successful.
Furthermore, the new law broadens the scope of permitted in-
demnity by adding employees to the list of parties who may be au-
thorized to obtain reimbursement from the corporation, and makes
certain that the executor or personal representative of a deceased de-
fendant may claim reimbursement for expenses incurred by the de-
ceased in the defense of an action.' 8
In addition, the new law is made applicable to foreign corpora-
tions "doing business" in this state.19 The provision was probably
unnecessary, for undoubtedly the law would be so interpreted by the
courts under the general rule that a foreign corporation not connected
with interstate commerce should not have privileges not given to
domestic corporations. A state statute will not be interpreted so as
to give a non-resident or a foreign corporation greater privilege than
is enjoyed by a resident or a domestic corporation. Furthermore, the
powers, duties and liabilities of a corporation, whether they concern
the internal affairs of the corporation or not, are regulated by the
state in which it carries on its business and not by the laws of its
domicile. As the state has the power to authorize an assessment on
domestic corporations, it follows that it may do so on foreign cor-
porations, for a corporation "doing business" in our State must be
obedient to our laws.2 0
Article 6a thus not only relieves directors of the hazards of liti-
gation, formerly "one of the risks attendant on directorship," 21 but
also clarifies, remedies and broadens the scope of corporation law.
GERALD IEFF.
17 Davidson v. Rodnon, 261 App. Div. 902, 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 167 (2d Dep't
1941); New York Dock Co., Inc. v. McCollum, cited supra note 1; SrEvNs
ON CORPORATIONS 673.is N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 64.
19 N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 68.
20 German American Coffee Co. v. Diehl, 216 N. Y. 57, 63, 109 N. E. 875,
876; Hayman v. Morris, 179 Misc. 265, 37 N. Y. S. (2d) 884 (Sup. Ct. 1942),
cited supra note 6.
21 Former Court of Appeals Judge Crouch, sitting as official referee in
the McCollum case.
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